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Abstract 
 
From the fall of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth 
century CE, until the establishment of the first truly 
supranational European institutions after the Second World 
War, many attempts were made to unify and bring peace to 
Europe. While the first attempts were for hegemonic 
unification, from the fourteenth century on, several plans were 
put forth for a civil unification. Each of these plans proposed 
specific institutions which were to bring together the 
sovereigns and (later) the nations of Europe for a peaceful 
coexistence. This study describes these numerous proposals, 
identifying the values and goals underlying the institutional 
structures each proposal set up. We argue that institutional 
structures have normative content, in that they embody 
specific ideologies of the European integration. Our analysis 
shows that the various proposals embody three distinct 
ideologies: integration through, and for the purpose of 
enhancing national sovereignty, integration through federation 
which limits national sovereignty, and integration through 
arrangements for free commerce that bypasses national 
sovereignty. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper traces the history of the idea of European unification and 
identifies the ideological underpinnings of the various streams of thought 
about the form such a union should have. It then connects these streams of 
thought to the origins of the unique supranational policymaking apparatus 
that subsequently evolved into the European Union. This approach 
endeavors to show that normative factors (the ideas or beliefs of particular 
actors) are primarily responsible for the particular direction the process of 
European integration has followed—from the first proposals for European 
unification, dating from the 14th and 15th centuries, until the penultimate 
efforts in the 1920s and 1930s. In tracing this history, we shall also make the 
argument that these proposals naturally set the parameters for the 
institutional structure of the ultimate proposal, the Schuman Plan of 1950 
for a European Coal and Steel Community. 
Traditional analyses of the European integration process have generally 
divided into two broad categories: structuralist and institutionalist. 
Structuralist interpretations view this process as a set or responses to 
objective structural imperatives. Major works in the structuralist tradition 
include Milward (1992) and Moravcsik (1998). These interpretations 
comprehend the European integration as a process wherein national 
governments work together to build particularly strong European 
institutions to meet specific policy challenges. 
Institutionalism interpretations concede that structural imperatives 
resulted in the original institutions of European integration. They argue, 
however, that once these institutions were in place, they acted as agents of 
integration, initiating new projects and mobilizing political coalitions to 
extend the breadth of integration. Major works reflecting the institutionalist 
approach include Haas (1958), Schmitter (1969a, 1969b), and Sandholtz and 
Sweet (1998). 
Both the structuralist and institutionalist approaches tend to discount 
the role of individuals. However, a growing body of literature presents 
compelling evidence to the fact that individual actors’ beliefs are important 
causes of political outcomes, including the shaping of institutional 
structures. These analyses also show that actors’ beliefs are reflected in the 
institutional structures which they shaped and that, therefore, institutional 
structures have normative content (Berman, 1998; Goldstein and Keohane, 
1993; Hall, 1993 and 1989; Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1999; Parsons, 2002). 
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Recognizing this fact, one can make the argument that similarly structured 
institutions embody similar ideologies. Furthermore, the ideology inherent 
in the structure of an institution would tend to favor outcomes that are 
consistent with the norms and values the particular ideology embodies. 
 
2. Efforts at European unification through hegemony: 9th-13th centuries 
 
The roots of efforts to unite Europe politically stretch far into the past—
running at least seven centuries long (Smith, 1992). Soon after the fall of the 
Western Roman Empire in the fifth century, a nostalgic desire for a 
reconstitution of the Pax Romana (Roman Peace) provided some validation 
to efforts to resurrect the empire in the west. The hope of reconstitution of 
imperial order and peace in Western Europe seemed to be fulfilled in 800 
CE by the coronation by Pope Leo III of Charlemagne as Holy Roman 
Emperor. While the reconstituted empire lasted formally until 1806, when 
it was dissolved by the last Emperor, Francis II, its existence as a cohesive 
political entity, unifying a large segment of Europe, lasted less than 100 
years after Charlemagne’s coronation (Jacob, 1928; Wilson, 2016). 
As the prospect of a pan-European Christian empire faded in the 10th 
century, the hope for peace and stability shifted to Rome itself, and the 
Holy See. Thus, the Pax Romana was, for a time, replaced with the idea of 
Pax Dei (the Peace of God), which was first proclaimed in 989, at the council 
of Charroux. It sought to limit the violence that had already become 
endemic to the western part of the Holy Roman Empire by using the threat 
of spiritual sanctions (such as excommunication) for some of the worst 
offences (Head and Landes, 1995; Duby, 1977; Cowdray, 1970). The 
unification of Europe under the spiritual authority of the Pope, however, 
proved even more problematic than that under the authority of the Holy 
Roman Emperor. For example, the attempt by the Pope to place bishops in 
secular positions with political power (a process termed lay investiture) was 
strenuously resisted by the sovereigns. This conflict ended in 1152 when 
Pope Callixtus II and Holy Roman Emperor Henry V reached an 
agreement, codified in the Concordat of Worms. In this agreement, the 
Pope retained the authority to appoint clerics and religious officials but 
gave up any claim to appointing clerics in secular offices (de Mesquita, 
2000). The spiritual authority of the Pope in Europe reached its highest 
point in the 12th and 13th centuries, as the various kingdoms more or less 
united in pursuit of the crusades (Bisson, 2009; Watt, 1965). After that, the 
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challenges to the authority of the church multiplied and intensified. These 
included the emergence of nation-states and the reformation—
developments that effectively eliminated any prospect for the unification of 
Europe and the establishment of peace through hegemonic power and 
authority (Aron, 2003; Møller, 2014).  
 
3. Early proposals toward a “civil peace”, 14th and 15th centuries 
 
The early efforts to unite Europe and achieve peace through hegemony 
clearly cannot be considered to have influenced directly the modern 
pursuit of European integration. They do, however, constitute a prelude 
and motivation for the evolution of ideas in the latter Middle Ages that 
began to examine the concept of civil (in contrast to imperial) peace (Aron, 
2003, p. 151-152; Parchami, 2009, p. 31). As the idea of a revitalized Roman 
Empire began to be replaced by the emergence of the state nation, political 
thinkers started to realize the dangers inherent in this process of 
transformation. The idea of nation state, after all, is predicated in 
separateness and differentiation and, therefore, disunity proved to be 
intrinsic to the evolution of the European political system from the latter 
Middle Ages onward. 
The threats to peace, stability, and justice from competing nation states 
were clear and pervasive. Furthermore, as challenges to the spiritual 
authority of the Roman Catholic Church started to emerge in the 13th and 
14th centuries, the hope that the Church would retain, let alone increase its 
role in keeping the peace faded. As a result, political theorists and 
practitioners started exploring alternative paths to peaceful co-existence. It 
did not take long for the idea that a civil, non-hegemonic political union 
could protect peace and justice to appear as a realistic alternative to 
hegemony. 
 
3.1. Pierre Dubois and the proposal for a European confederation 
One of the earliest proposals for such a union, dating from 1306, came 
from the French jurist and political theorist Pierre Dubois. Dubois’s 
proposal, in a pamphlet titled “De recuperatione Terre Sancte” (1306), which 
he sent to kings Edward I of England and Philip IV of France, ostensibly 
concerned the undertaking of a successful crusade. In this pamphlet, 
sections of which were directed exclusively to the king of France, Dubois 
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urged Philip IV to lead an initiative for a civil confederation of European 
states. 
Dubois understood that the undertaking of a crusade would require the 
securing of peace, justice, and stability in Europe. He saw a political union 
as a necessary pre-requisite for the successful recovery and defense of the 
Holy Land. Dubois proposed the establishment of a permanent council, 
which would “consist of princes as well as ecclesiastics” (Brandt, 1956), 
effecting a European confederation. The French monarch would convene 
and preside over this institution. 
The Council would have the authority to act against vassals who 
committed acts of aggression against each other or against their sovereign 
(Dubois, 1306, par. 5). Once the aggressors could be brought to justice, they 
would be exiled by the Council to the Holy Land, where, on the one hand 
they would find a proper outlet for their desire to pursue war, and on the 
other, they would help colonize the area with a Roman Catholic 
population. The Council would be empowered to reward all those who 
assisted in the suppression and punishment of the aggressors, with plenary 
indulgences (blanket absolutions of sin) which would be confirmed by the 
Pope (one assumes, through his representatives on the council). 
If the aggression was from one sovereign against another, the council 
would appoint a panel of arbitrators. This panel would select a court of 
nine judges, three neutral members and three from each of the warring 
sides (Dubois, 1306, par. 12). The decision of this court would be enforced 
in the same manner as that of the council. 
The ideology represented by the institutions of the European 
Confederation proposed by Dubois is revealed by looking at them through 
the lens of the historical temporal and geographic milieu within which he 
operated. At the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th century, France 
had emerged as the preeminent power in Europe. Philip IV represented a 
transformational force in the history of France and Europe. By relying on 
civil servants such as Guillaume de Nogaret and Enguerrand de Marigny 
to govern, rather than on nobles, and by granting serfs the right to purchase 
their freedom, Philip set into motion the transformation of the French 
political system from feudalism into a centralized state. Externally, he 
challenged any authority higher than his own, refusing any allegiance to 
the Holy Roman Emperor, and battling with Pope Boniface VIII for control 
of the clergy and of church properties in France. Philip destroyed the 
Knights Templar, managed to get a Frenchman elected Pope (Clement V), 
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and to move the official seat of the Holy See to Avignon, placing the church 
under French control (Strayer, 1980). To secure support for his actions 
against the church, Philip conceived the idea of assembling the Estates 
General, with the first meeting in Paris in 1302, which Pierre Dubois 
attended as a bourgeois representative.  
Dubois’s proposal embodies the ideas of national sovereignty and 
secularism promulgated in France at that time. Not only does he 
differentiate between sovereign “princes” and their vassal nobles, but he 
explicitly describes the former as principes superiores in terris non 
recognoscentes, which Brandt translates as “princes who recognize no 
superior authority on earth” (1956, p. 78). Therefore, the structures of the 
council and the arbitration body explicitly affirm and guarantee the 
supremacy of these princes over all other secular and religious authority. 
Although some of the penalties and rewards to be meted out by the council 
or the court (as discussed above) are religious in nature and to be delivered 
by the Holy See, Dubois assumes that the Pope will have little or no 
discretion in the matter (Dubois, 1306, par. 7). In fact, secularism permeates 
Dubois’s proposals that complement his ideas on the institutions of the 
European confederation. In later sections of his pamphlet he proposes 
significant reforms of the church, of education, and of the judicial system 
(Brandt, 1956, pp. 39-41). Thus, his proposal introduces some of the 
fundamental ideas and principles of modern proposals for European 
integration. 
 
3.2. George of Bohemia’s proposed Treaty 
More than a hundred and fifty years later a similar proposal for the 
European confederation was put forth by George of Podebrad (1420-71, 
King of Bohemia, 1458-71). The ostensible purposes of the confederation 
were the maintenance of peace in Europe and the defense of the continent 
from the encroachment of the Ottoman Turkish Empire. The confederation 
was to be governed by a set of formal institutions, the principal of which 
was to be an Assembly, comprising of plenipotentiary representatives of 
the heads of the member states. King George envisaged, and, informally 
offered, the King of France the presiding position of the confederation. 
George of Pdebrad’s proposal was much more detailed than Dubois’s. 
For example, the proposal described where the organization was to be 
based. The Assembly was to be a permanent body, based in a city of each of 
the member states for five years, before moving to the next. The Assembly 
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was to employ a body of civil servants who, however, would not be 
permanent employees, being drawn every five years, in turn, from the 
country in which it was based (Heymann, 1972, pp. 87-88). The second 
institution of the confederation was a Tribunal, the purpose of which was 
to administer justice, but the organization of which was left to the 
Assembly (Kapras, 1919, p. 15).  
The Assembly of King George’s proposal would exercise functions 
similar to Dubois’s council. The Assembly’s operation is, however, also 
described in much more detail. It would reach its decisions by majority 
vote, although not by the vote of each individual state. Instead, the member 
states were to be organized in groups called “nationes.” For example, the 
several German states would constitute the German nation, and would 
have to agree amongst themselves on how to cast their single vote 
(Heymann, 1972, p.25). Unlike Dubois’s council, the Assembly would have 
the power to raise and direct armies. 
King George’s proposal would, essentially, create the world’s first 
formal international organization. The organization was to have a number 
of explicitly described powers. It would receive revenue from the member 
states in proportion to the tax base of each. It would have its own coat of 
arms, seal, treasury, and archive (Kapras, 1919, p. 15). It would have a large 
body of high and low rank officials, among them a sindicus (secretary-
general or chancellor), a procurator fiscalis (treasurer), collectors (tax 
collectors), etc. (Heymann, 1972, pp. 22-29). 
Unlike Dubois’s proposal, which was essentially theoretical, the 
proposal put forth by King George of Bohemia, was an actual treaty: 
Tractatus Pacis Toti Christianitati Fiendae (Treaty on the Establishment of 
Peach throughout Christendom). It is almost certain that King George did 
not develop this proposal alone, but in close consultation and on the advice 
of his adviser and counsellor, Antoine Martini of Grenoble (Kapras, 1919, p. 
9). The treaty was sent to King Casimir of Poland in the summer of 1463, 
and its text was recorded in the archives of the Polish Royal Chancellery 
(the Metryka koronna). There is also evidence that between 1462 and 1464 
Martini traveled to Venice, Burgundy, and France, to discuss this treaty 
(Heymann, 1972, pp. 37-39). The historical circumstances of the period 
immediately preceding the development of the proposal, and the reception 
and ultimate fate of the treaty in the courts of Europe reveal the norms and 
values underlying the proposal and the outcome King Gorge and Martini 
had hoped to achieve. 
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In the early part of the 15th century, a pre-Protestant Christian reform 
movement, the Hussite movement, emerged in Bohemia, Moravia, and 
Silesia, posing the first serious theological challenge to the Catholic Church. 
Attempts by the Holy Roman Empire, the Papacy, and various monarchs 
loyal to the Church, led to the Hussite Wars, which lasted from 1419 to 
about 1434, and ultimately resulted in a compromise, ratified by the 
Council of Basel in 1436. The compromise reconciled the moderate Hussite 
faction, led by George of Podebrad, with the Catholic Church, while 
allowing the Hussites certain freedoms (Heymann, 1965). George was 
elected king by the Estates of Bohemia in 1458 and he worked to reconcile 
the Hussites and Catholics of the kingdom. Nevertheless, opposition in 
Rome to the existence of the Hussite church increased with the election of 
Pope Pius II, who, in 1462, declared the compacts of the Council of Basel 
null and void. 
George of Bohemia responded to the threat from Rome by speeding up 
the transformation of the Government of Bohemia into a secular regime 
and by intensifying diplomatic efforts that promoted secular governance, 
religious freedom, and independence of nation states from Rome and the 
Holy Roman Empire. The proposed Treaty for the Establishment of Peace 
throughout Christendom was George’s ultimate and most ambitious effort 
in that regard. A close reading of the articles establishing the Assembly 
reveals the ideological underpinnings of this institution. The Assembly 
makes no reference to the authority of the Church as a means for coercion 
or reward in enforcing the peace among its member states. While allowing 
membership of the Holy Roman Emperor, it is only as sovereign of a 
German Kingdom and, therefore, as an equal among equals. On the other 
hand, the Pope is explicitly excluded from membership, even though he is, 
in fact, also the monarch of the Papal State. In this way, while the treaty 
also explicitly guarantees the Pope’s ecclesiastical power, it implicitly 
removes his ability to interfere in secular matters (Kapras, 1919, p. 13). 
Thus, the institution is revealed to be a vehicle for secularism, national 
sovereignty, and religious freedom. Although defense against Ottoman 
expansion in Europe is a significant concern, as the proposal comes only 
nine years after the fall of Constantinople, it is rather clear that the main 
outcome George hoped for if his treaty were enacted, was the security of 
his and of all the other sovereign governments of Europe, and their 
independence from Rome and the Holy Roman Empire. This is revealed in 
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the vehemence with which the papacy resisted the proposed treaty, 
ultimately managing to doom it to failure (Heymann, 1972). 
 
4. The aftermath of the Wars of Religion: Peace proposals in the 17th 
and 18th centuries 
 
On October 31, 1517, the publication of the Disputatio pro declaration 
virtutis indulgentiarum (Disputation on the Power of Indulgences) by Martin 
Luther, unleashed a chain of events which made any proposal for the 
European unification impossible for over a hundred years. The popular 
support for this challenge to the Catholic Church was taken up by a 
number of German free cities and nobles and was utilized to assert 
independence from the Holy Roman Emperor (Scott, 1989). The first 
conflict, the “knights’ revolt” in 1522, provided the spark that ignited a 
conflagration which consumed the continent for well over a century 
(Hitchcock, 1958). The, so called, European wars of religion reached their 
climax in the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), having devastated central and 
western Europe and caused the death of between 8 and 10 million people. 
The 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which ended this 126-year-long conflict, 
effectively established the modern international system of sovereign states 
(Croxton, 1999). 
 
4.1. Éméric Crucé’s plan for universal peace 
While the period of the wars of religion effectively prohibited the 
evolution of any proposals for the European unification, the devastation it 
wrought upon the continent did provide impetus for such proposals as the 
Thirty Years’ War approached its conclusion (Villaverde, 2017). The first 
proposal for a lasting peace came from Éméric Crucé (c1590-1648), a French 
writer about whom very few specifics are known. In 1623, Crucé published 
a book titled “Le Nouveau Cynée ou Discours d’Estat représentant les occasions 
et moyens d’establir une paix générale et la liberté de commerce pour tout le 
monde” (The New Cyneas or Discourse of the occasions and means to 
establish a general peace and free commerce throughout the world). In this 
book, Crucé argued that the foundation of a permanent general peace 
should be the common humanity which overarches differences of race, 
religion, or culture (Mansfield, 2013). In this, Crucé’s proposal differed 
from all those preceding it, and most of those following it, in that it 
included not only the Christian nations of Europe, but the nations of Asia 
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and Africa as well, namely the Ottoman Empire, Persia, India, China, and 
Ethiopia (Terminski, 2010). 
While Crucé’s “New Cyneas” could be considered more of a 
predecessor of developments such as the League of Nations and the United 
Nations than of the European integration, it is nevertheless important to 
discuss it in the context of efforts toward European unification because of 
its likely influence on later proposals (Mansfield, 2013). In “New Cyneas” 
Crucé argued that war was the result of pride, posturing and generally, 
misunderstandings among governments and sovereigns. He argued that 
the potential for conflict could be reduced and, ultimately, eliminated 
through the establishment of free commerce which would increase 
communication and bring people together (Balch, 1909, pp. x-xii). To this 
end, he proposed a single currency, standardization of weights and 
measures, and guaranteeing the free movement of people and goods 
(Mansfield, 2013). In order to protect this system of free trade, and reduce 
the prospect of war, Crucé proposed a permanent international body, a 
council of princes or their representatives, which would be based in Venice 
(a pre-eminent global trading power). This council would serve both as a 
facilitator of communication between the governments of sovereign 
nations, and as a tribunal adjudicating both national and international 
disputes (Mansfield, 1900). 
Crucé’s ideas for the pursuit of a permanent and universal peace 
centered on the protection of national sovereignty while, at the same time, 
introducing a system which would make peace increasingly profitable for 
all states that participated in it. The expansion of trade that would result 
from direct measures such as a common currency and standardization, as 
well as indirectly through the maintenance of peace, stability, and justice, 
would make it profitable for sovereigns to maintain peace, and 
unprofitable to pursue war. In addition, the expansion of trade and 
merchant classes to the detriment of the warrior class would increase social 
support for peace rather than war (Terminski, 2010; Mansfield, 2013). 
 
4.2. The Duke of Sully’s Grand Design 
Although Crucé’s book remained obscure, there is some evidence to 
support the claim that it was known to, and influenced the proposals of his 
near contemporary, Maximilien de Béthune, Duke of Sully (1560-1641) 
(Villaverde, 2017). The Duke of Sully was a Huguenot (French protestant) 
statesman who served as advisor and Superintendent of Finances (minister 
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of finance) to King Henry IV of France, who presented, in his memoires, a 
Grand Design for the establishment and perpetuation of peace in Europe. 
Sully attributed this design to Henry IV, though this claim is almost 
certainly false. The Grand Design proposed the European federation 
consisting of fifteen roughly equal states with three types of political 
systems: six hereditary monarchies (France, Spain, Britain, Denmark, 
Sweden, and Lombardy), five elective monarchies (Holy Roman Empire, 
Papal States, Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia), and four republics (Venice, 
Italy, Switzerland, Belgium/Netherlands). The federation would be 
governed by a senate of about sixty-six representatives apportioned to the 
participating States (Ogg, 1921, pp. 41-44). The senators would be elected 
every three years. There would be subordinate and local assemblies, whose 
composition and powers were not defined in any detail. Nevertheless, the 
general senate would be the only body empowered to produce “final and 
irrevocable decrees.” 
In contrast to Crucé’s ideas about universality, an important objective of 
Sully’s federation was to protect its members from threats emanating from 
the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, similar to Crucé, Sully placed equal 
importance (and possibly greater significance) to the prospect that the 
federation would impose freedom of commerce among its member states 
(Ogg, 1921, p. 11). 
Sully’s Grand Design appeared in the memoires he published in 1638 
and echoes the values and intensions of Dubois and George of Bohemia as 
well as, at least partially, those of Crucé’. Its main governing body would 
be comprised of representatives of sovereign states. The institutional 
structure of the federation would clearly espouse secularism. These values 
are revealed by the inclusion of the Pope as a secular sovereign, and the 
Holy Roman Emperor as one sovereign among fifteen. Sully’s proposal is 
based on the attainment of a balance of power among the fifteen states. Of 
particular concern to him was the power of the Habsburg (Holy Roman) 
Empire. For the purpose of limiting this power, Sully proposed that the title 
of Holy Roman Emperor return to being an elected office—one for which 
all the princes of Germany should be eligible. To this end also was the 
recognition and protection of the independence of the Belgian (Low 
Countries) and Italian republics. This international order clearly anticipates 
the structure that would be established a mere ten years later by the Peace 
of Westphalia. The provisions promoting freedom of commerce reflect the 
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author’s experience in governing France’s finances, and foresee the 
proposals for the European integration developed in the 20th century. 
Sully’s Grand Design was explicitly referenced and used as a basis for 
another plan for the European unification—that of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre 
(Balch, 1900, van Heerikhouizen, 2008). This plan was first published in 
Utrecht, in 1713—the place and year marking the peace negotiations to end 
the War of Spanish Succession. Saint-Pierre’s volume titled “Projet pour 
rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe” (Project for establishing permanent 
peace in Europe) described the conditions necessary for guaranteeing that 
the Peace of Utrecht would last in perpetuity. Unlike Sully’s concern over 
the Habsburg Empire’s level of power and control of European affairs, 
however, Saint-Pierre’s concern was the threat of French hegemony under 
Louis XIV (Mansfield, 2013). Therefore, it is interesting to note that Saint-
Pierre’s proposed structure for securing peace very much resembles that 
proposed by Sully (a Perpetual Congress, or Senate, comprised of 
representatives of the member states, and a fundamental treaty 
guaranteeing the territory, rights and privileges of each sovereign agreeing 
to it). Thus, a system guaranteeing sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
based on a balance of power, seemed to both men to be the best way to 
preserve peace in Europe (van Heerikhuizen, 2008). 
 
4.3. From intergovernmentalism to federation: Saint-Pierre, Penn, 
Rousseau and Bentham 
While the proposals of Crucé, Sully, and Saint-Pierre sought to promote 
peace and stability in Europe (or, in the case of Crucé, in the entire world) 
through the safeguarding of national sovereignty and establishing a 
balance of power, serious doubts remained as to whether sovereignty, 
which had, in fact, been the source of so much conflict in the course of the 
17th century, could be transformed into an effective vehicle for peace. 
Reacting to the same historical milieu as Saint-Pierre, specifically, the series 
of wars pursued by Louis XIV from 1667 onwards, William Penn also felt 
compelled to develop a plan for promoting peace in Europe. 
Penn, alarmed by the human misery, devastation, injustice, and waves 
of refugees produced by France’s offensive wars, which had been pursued 
for the expansion of its power and not as a result of any threat to its 
sovereignty, wrote An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe 
(1693-94). In it, he proposed that the solution to international conflict was 
the same as to internal conflict: justice and tolerance (Penn, 1693, Sect. II). 
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However, just as these values could not be guaranteed domestically by a 
government of absolute monarchical rule, so could they not be pursued at 
the international level without a democratic system of governance? Thus, 
for Penn, the solution to the problem of war was to be found in the 
establishment of the European government based on the model of the 
Dutch parliamentary system. In the same way as the provinces of the 
Netherlands sent deputies to the States General, seated at The Hague, the 
nations of Europe, including non-Christian countries, would send deputies 
to a European Diet or Parliament (van Heerikhuisen, 2008). Thus, for the 
first time, a proposal for European unification is put forth that explicitly 
limits national sovereignty and establishes a truly federal structure. 
The ideas of Crucé, Sully, Penn, and Saint-Pierre received little attention 
from political figures of their times (17th and early 18th centuries). 
Nevertheless, they did influence European political philosophers and were 
revived at the end of the 18th century, as challenges to absolute monarchy 
emerged in continental Europe, ultimately leading to the French Revolution 
and another era of intense international conflict. Political thinkers such as 
Jean Jacques Rousseau and Jeremy Bentham revived the earlier proposals 
and refined them, putting forth their own plans for the European common 
polity. 
Rousseau was particularly fascinated by Saint-Pierre’s proposal for a 
European Federation. He was both its critic and proponent (van 
Heerikhuisen, 2008). He believed it to be totally impractical because 
monarchs were too proud and ambitious to accept and submit to a 
supranational legal order. On the other hand, he did see a possibility for 
such an order to be established, but only through violent means: 
No Federation could ever be established except by a revolution. That 
being so, which of us would dare to say whether the League of Europe is a 
thing more to be desired or feared? It would perhaps do more harm in a 
moment than it would guard against for ages. (Rousseau, 1782) 
If the European federation were to be established and to be effective in 
protecting peace, it would need to have at its disposal the means to coerce 
national sovereigns to accede to the demands of a central authority such as 
Saint-Pierre’s Congress. Thus, in Rousseau’s view, the Congress would 
need to have at its disposal a federal army, making the Congress much 
more of a federal institution (along the lines of William Penn’s proposal) 
than Saint-Pierre’s assembly of national government representatives 
(Rousseau, 1782). 
Dr.Sc. Consatantine HADJILAMBRINOS 
_____________________________ 
ILIRIA International Review – Vol 8, No 2 (2018) 
© Felix–Verlag, Holzkirchen, Germany and Iliria College, Pristina, Kosovo 
136 
Proceeding from a philosophical perspective entirely different from that 
of Rousseau, Jeremy Bentham reached a very similar conclusion. In his 
fourth essay of The Principles of International Law, titled “A Plan for a 
Universal and Perpetual Peace”, published in 1789, he sets two conditions 
necessary for universal peace: the emancipation of colonies and the 
reduction and limitation of national sovereignty. To achieve the second 
condition, Bentham proposes the establishment of a European Congress or 
Diet (to be elected directly by the people of Europe) and a Court of Justice 
(Bentham, 1789). These clearly federal institutions, Bentham hoped, would 
be able to realize the conditions for a permanent peace in Europe: freedom 
of the press, free trade, reduction in military expenditures, and the 
emancipation of all colonies. 
Ultimately, neither Rousseau’s nor Bentham’s proposals were put in 
practice. At the end of the 18th century, the French Revolution and the rise 
of Napoleon Bonaparte revived a push for hegemonic integration of 
Europe, reminiscent of the 9th century. However, the new cycle of war and 
devastation served to preserve and, even intensify, the hope for a civil 
peace through political integration of Europe. 
 
5. New ideas for promoting a common European identity: the 19th century 
 
In 1814, as the order of the post-Napoleonic Europe was being created at 
the Vienna Congress, the Count Henri de Saint-Simon and his pupil cum 
secretary Augustin Thierry published a plan for the European Federation 
that was explicitly addressed to the British and French parliaments, but 
was disseminated widely, really directed to the political and social elites of 
Europe. This plan, while similar in some respects to previous proposals, 
contained some significant differences. First, it anticipated that the process 
of industrialization, then barely begun, would create social forces which 
could work for the unity of Europe. In essence, the plan aimed not only to 
bring peace to the continent, but also to promote economic prosperity. 
Second, Saint-Simon predicted, and clearly stated so in the plan, that a 
prerequisite for the European unification would be the ascendance of 
parliamentary power in Europe. Third, breaking with all previous 
proposals, Saint-Simon’s plan did not call for an immediate broad union 
but, rather, envisioned an incremental process, calling for an immediate 
union of only Britain and France which would broaden only as other 
European states adopted parliamentary systems and chose to participate. 
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Fourth, Saint-Simon understood that another prerequisite for European 
Union was the creation of a European identity which did not as yet exist. 
He also understood that supranational institutions would be instrumental 
in the creation of such an identity. In order to get around the problem of 
establishing such institutions without a widely established common 
identity, he proposed that those socio-economic groups which he assumed 
did have a European outlook comprise these institutions. Specifically, he 
proposed a bicameral European Parliament, the members of the lower 
chamber (Chamber of Deputies) of which would come exclusively from 
certain professional groups: 
These deputies would be elected not through a plebiscite, but by their 
respective professional associations. Because of its emphasis on economic 
(as well as security) considerations and its reliance on professional and 
technical expertise, Saint-Simon’s plan can be considered the first to contain 
functionalist elements. 
Although the institutional structure of Saint-Simon’s proposal is, on the 
surface, a bi-cameral parliament, it is fundamentally different from the 
parliamentary structures that had been proposed by William Penn and 
Jeremy Bentham. While their parliaments are directly elected from and by 
the people of Europe and are, therefore, democratic, federalist institutions, 
Saint-Simon’s Parliament is elevated from and by a technocracy. While its 
structure is functionalist, placing faith on slowly building upon narrow 
common interests to eventually broaden the reach of the European 
institutions, its ideological foundation is non-democratic. It elevates 
expertise above common sense, and it privileges the new technocratic elite 
of the emerging industrial era. 
Henri de Saint-Simon represents the leading edge of a growing wave of 
efforts toward European integration. The idea of a unified Europe became 
an almost permanent aspect of international political discourse during the 
nineteenth century. By the second quarter of that century, the European 
peace movement grew, becoming established in almost all of the 
continent’s nations. As it had always been closely associated with the 
European idea, the two moved forward together in an increasingly intimate 
association. Thus, from the middle of the century onwards, the “European 
idea entered into nearly all of the numerous international peace 
conferences and congresses...” (Pegg, 1983, p. 4). 
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6. The 20th century: commerce at the core of the European integration 
efforts 
 
The dawning of the 20th century brought some new concerns and 
sparked new ideas for the raison d’etre and the path of the European 
integration. While the desire for peace remained the strongest impetus for 
pushing for European unification, a number of prominent Europeans, 
echoing the sentiments of Saint-Simon, became increasingly concerned 
about Europe’s ability to maintain its economic primacy, especially in view 
of the growing economic power of the United States primarily, and Russia 
secondarily. Thus, for the first time, proposals for economic integration were 
put forth by people such as Anatole and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, Sir Max 
Waechter (who in early 1914 established in London the European Unity 
League to work for a “Federation of the States of Europe on an economic 
basis”), the Prince de Cassano, and others (Pegg, 1983). 
The outbreak of hostilities which marked the onset of the World War I in 
August 1914 did not eliminate or even suspend the hopes for a united 
Europe. In the early days of the war, pacifists throughout Europe felt that 
the conflict would make obvious the shortcomings of militant nationalism 
and ultimately enhance prospects for unity among the nations of the 
continent. As a result, many Europeanist organizations sprang up in the 
Entente countries, as well as in Germany and Austria-Hungary. The war 
effort itself necessitated integrating the allies’ efforts in the economic, as 
well as the military sphere. A prominent example of this integration was 
the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council (IAMTC) which, though it did 
not survive long after the end of the war, laid the foundations for future 
efforts at integration in specific functional areas. By the end of the war, 
however, two forces combined to diffuse this movement. On the one hand, 
the geographic expansion of the war, particularly with the entrance of the 
United States, shifted the peace movement from a European to a global 
focus. On the other, the retreat of Russia from its Baltic provinces and 
Poland and the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire brought on 
demands for the right of national self determination that worked against 
the prospect of European federation (Pegg, 1983, pp. 11-14). 
After the end of World War I there were, again, numerous proposals 
and efforts towards European unification despite the peace movement’s 
shift of focus towards the League of Nations. Of these efforts, two deserve 
particular attention because they, in many ways, anticipated the 
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developments that took place after World War II. The first of these came 
from Louis Loucheur, a French industrialist who during the war moved to 
increasingly more important government positions. In 1918, immediately 
following the end of hostilities, Loucheur was appointed to the newly 
created office of Minister for Industrial Reconstruction. He immediately 
saw that reconstruction, future economic prosperity, and peace and 
stability, would all be enhanced by close economic cooperation. Thus, in 
1919, he proposed the formation of an international steel cartel 
encompassing France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Belgium. In 1925, he 
presented a proposal for a world economic conference to the League of 
Nations on behalf of the French delegation. His hope was that such a 
conference would promote free trade, and that within its auspices, there 
would be an opportunity to push for a European customs union. Speaking 
about the conference, which was to be held in May 1927, “he told an 
audience at the University of Brussels that issues related to a European 
customs union would be discussed at the conference and that the European 
delegates should keep in mind the ‘possibility of at least the beginning of 
the United States of Europe.’ He repeated the themes in a speech to a group 
of German businessmen in April [1927], adding that the formation of 
industrial cartels should precede tariff reductions” (Carls, 1993, p. 268). 
Unfortunately, the World Economic Conference produced no action other 
that some reports. Nevertheless, Loucheur continued to argue for a 
European economic union until the end of his life in 1931 (Carls, 1993, pp. 
262-301). 
The second effort came in 1929 from then foreign minister of France, 
Aristide Briand, who in a speech at the Tenth Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of the League of Nations proposed an economic association of 
the nations of Europe. This suggestion was received positively by many of 
the representatives of the European League members and in an unofficial 
meeting of the heads of the European delegations a few days later, it was 
agreed that the French Foreign Ministry would draft a memorandum on 
the European federal system which it would formally present to the other 
European governments who would study it and respond. The 
Memorandum on the Organization of a System of the European Federal 
Union was released on May 17, 1930, and presented to the twenty-seven 
European nations that were members of the League of Nations (i.e., this 
excluded Turkey and the Soviet Union). The Memorandum proposed an 
organization independent of the League of Nations (however, it was 
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envisioned that it would operate in close cooperation with the League), but 
whose institutions resembled those of the League: a Conference (i.e., a 
general assembly of all the member states), a Permanent Political 
Committee (an executive body composed of a small number of member 
states), and a Secretariat (the organization’s administrative body). While 
the large majority of European countries reacted positively to this proposal, 
Germany, Britain, and Italy opposed it. 
Each of these three large European countries was averse to any proposal 
of European unification for its own reasons. Germany saw the European 
Federal Union as an institution that would make the status quo of national 
borders permanent. This would threaten its attempts to reshape its eastern 
borders to include the large German populations in Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, and elsewhere. Britain was more interested in integrating the 
economies of its vast empire and with maintaining close cooperation with 
the United States. Italy, which was already under Fascist rule, was 
interested in creating an empire. However, because of the broad support 
for the proposal, none of these three countries rejected it outright. Instead, 
they worked to subvert it, first by insisting that the organization can be 
created within the framework of the League of Nations (where they knew 
they could count on the suspicion and, even, hostility, toward the idea by 
non-European nations), then by insisting that non-League countries such as 
Turkey and the Soviet Union (and even countries with no European 
territories whatsoever) may be invited to participate in the organization 
and generally, making whatever proposals they thought would slow down 
the process of setting up the organization (Pegg, 1983, pp. 103-165). As a 
result, the best Briand was able to accomplish was the creation of a 
Commission of Inquiry for the European Union under the auspices of the 
League of Nations. The Commission was established on September 17, 
1930, (three days after the German elections in which the National Socialists 
scored significant gains) and Briand was elected its president. It met for 
two years and, while it made some progress, its mission ultimately failed 
due to the rise of totalitarianism in Europe and to Briand’s death in March 
1932. 
Both Loucheur’s and Briand’s proposals were essentially technocratic 
and functionalist in nature, focusing on achieving a breakthrough in one 
functional area, trade, so as to establish a structure that would permanently 
engage the nations of Europe in close contact, cooperation, and on-going 
negotiation. While Briand’s proposal did not include any particular 
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institutional structure, Loucheur’s would have put in place a structure 
which mimicked that of the League of Nations. Political control, thus, 
would have rested with institutions that were structured to represent 
national governments (the Conference and the Permanent Political 
Committee), which would have given preeminence to national sovereignty 
concerns. One must note, however, that the reactions of Germany, Britain, 
and Italy reveal the real possibility that such an organization would place 
significant restraints on the exercise of national sovereignty—something 
that was at least one of Briand’s and France’s expectations vis a vis the 
proposed European Federal Union (Pegg, 1983, pp. 103-165). 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
It should not be surprising that a review of the history of proposals for 
the European integration would reveal that the authors of the proposals 
tried to address the particular threats to peace and stability in Europe of 
their historical milieu. The first important finding of this paper is that there 
are important and significant similarities in the nature of these threats 
across surprisingly long spans of time. 
From the early 14th century until the end of the 17th century, the main 
threat to peace, stability, and prosperity in Europe was not external (i.e. 
Ottoman expansion). It was not even the political fragmentation of Europe, 
per se, but, rather, the attempt to eliminate this fragmentation through the 
establishment of a hegemonic order. The plans of Pierre Dubois, George of 
Bohemia, Éméric Crucé, and the Duke of Sully, were all designed to 
address the threat that the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church 
presented for the broad community of European nations. To put it plainly, 
the threat was to local (and, eventually national) political and religious self-
determination. 
In the late 17th and 18th centuries, the nature of the threat to peace in 
Europe remained the same, but it now took the form of French 
expansionism and attempt at European hegemony. The plans of the Abbé 
de Saint-Pierre and William Penn attempted to address this problem in two 
different ways. Saint-Pierre followed the spirit of earlier proposals for a 
confederation of sovereign nation states. Penn, for the first time, proposed 
the limitation of national sovereignty through a true federation. 
The period from the late 18th to the first half of the 20th centuries saw a 
continuation of the conflict between the nations of France and Germany 
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(the latter having lost its mantle of legitimacy as the Holy Roman Empire) 
for European hegemony, albeit with the emergence of powers at the 
periphery and outside Europe: Britain, Russia, and the United States of 
America. The plans of Rousseau, Bentham, Saint-Simon, Loucheur, and 
Briand all respond to the emergence of nationalism and, therefore, national 
sovereignty as the primary impediment to peace, security, and prosperity 
in Europe. 
The first conclusion of this study, then, is that all of the plans for 
European integration, from the early 14th century to the mid-20th century 
were, primarily, responses to the threat of the hegemonic European order. 
We also see that the specific shape of that threat did change over time but, 
at the core of it, there remained a tension between France on the one side, 
and the Holy Roman Empire (and its descendant, Germany) on the other. 
These findings lead us to the second conclusion of my paper. The 
institutions proposed by the several plans for European integration do have 
normative content. Each set of the proposed institutions, in fact, embodies 
the values at the core of the resistance to hegemony present in each of the 
three historic periods described above. 
The plans put forth by Pierre Dubois, George of Bohemia, Éméric Crucé, 
the Duke of Sully, and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre all propose the 
establishment of an institution comprised of either sovereigns themselves 
or their representatives (let us term this institution a Council). In all 
instances, participation of religious authority (namely the Catholic Church) 
in such a Council is severely restricted or entirely prohibited. The 
institution of an intergovernmental Council embodies the values of 
local/national autonomy in the political and religious spheres, expressed as 
the principle of secular sovereignty. A European Council of national 
representatives is an instrument for the protection of sovereignty and for 
resistance to any attempt at political or religious hegemony. These plans, 
and the institutions they propose, respond to the threats we identified in 
the first period (13th to late 17th centuries) we discussed above. Saint-
Pierre’s plan is similar to the earlier ones because he perceived the threat to 
peace of Louis XIV as an attempt at both political and religious hegemony. 
After all, Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes (which, since 1598, had 
granted protection to protestants in France) and commenced active 
persecution of non-Catholics in his realm (Villaverde, 2017). 
From the late 17th century on, the primary threat to peace in Europe 
came from conflicts among sovereign national entities. In the early part of 
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this period, the conflict was essentially between Monarchs; therefore, the 
appropriate response seemed to be European institutions representing a 
more pluralistic form of governance. Consequently, the plans put forth by 
William Penn, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Jeremy Bentham, all proposed 
institutions that represented the people of Europe directly, rather than their 
sovereign national governments (let us term this type of institution a 
Parliament). The European Parliaments proposed by these political 
philosophers embody the ideologies of representative government and 
democratic supra-nationalism (federalism). They are an instrument for 
checking, limiting, and reducing the power of monarchs specifically and 
more broadly, the extent of national sovereignty. 
The aftermath of the French revolution, seen in the history of the 19th 
and 20th centuries, revealed that representative government was not, in and 
of itself, a shield against either nationalism or war. The system of the 
European states, even though several of them were (at one point or another 
during this period) republics, proved as prone to pursue war as a means for 
resolving international conflict as the monarchies that preceded them. In 
response to this, proposals for European integration in the 19th and first half 
of the 20th centuries took a new approach. The proposals of Saint-Simon, 
Loucheur, and Briand focused on the argument, first made by Crucé, that 
free commerce could be an effective vehicle for promoting peace and 
stability. However, the distinctive element of these three proposals was that 
they sought to bypass national sovereignty. The institutions they proposed 
embodied an ideology of technocracy, essentially representing specific 
economic interests, such as trade associations and industrial and 
commercial interests (let us term this type of institution a Committee). The 
objectives of all three of these proposals were to initiate a functional 
process of integration, wherein the pursuit of increasing economic benefits 
would lead to a gradual surrender of national sovereignty. Such 
Committees of technical experts would lead rather than respond to popular 
and sovereign sentiment. 
Thus, by the eve of World War II, we see that the various proposals for 
European integration can be divided into three distinct approaches: 
1. Intergovernmentalism—designed to pursue integration for the 
purpose of enhancing sovereignty. 
2. Supranational federalism—designed to pursue integration for the 
purpose of constraining sovereignty. 
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3. Supranational technocracy—designed to pursue integration by 
bypassing and, ultimately, rendering sovereignty irrelevant. 
 
Each of these approaches relied on distinct and different institutional 
structures. Intergovernmentalism relied on Councils of representatives of 
sovereign governments. Supranational federalism relied on parliamentary 
bodies comprised of representatives directly elected by the people. 
Supranational technocracy relied on bodies of technical experts. One can 
easily discern that the three approaches are not actually compatible with 
one-another. Knowing the ultimate institutional structure which was put in 
place in 1951 (that of the European Coal and Steel Community, which has 
evolved into the European Union) to pursue European integration, one can 
anticipate significant strains and conflicts within the structure of the 
European Union. We believe that the findings of this paper—that the 
strains are manifestations of inherent ideological differences embodied in 
the institutions themselves—can help elucidate and, ultimately, address 
these strains. 
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